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  For the definition of "material" under §10(b) and rule1
10b-5, see infra §4:2.
  For the definition of "nonpublic" under §10(b) and rule2
10b-5, see infra §4:3.
3  On rare occasions, this treatise uses the phrase
"corporate insider" to refer to a corporate employee or the 
equivalent of such an employee.  For examples of the use of the 
phrase "corporate insider," see the discussion of the "classical 
special relationship triangle" infra notes 34-38 and accompanying 
text; §§5:2.1, 6:7.
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EXCERPT FROM VOLUME ONE OF WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG,
INSIDER TRADING (PLI 2D. ED. 2006).
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
In this book, the term "insider trading" means trading by
anyone (inside or outside of the issuer) on any type of material1
nonpublic  information about the issuer or about the market for2
the security.  "Tipping" or "insider tipping" is the
communication by anyone of this type of information to another
person.  Thus, "insider trading" and "insider tipping" are not
confined to corporate "insiders" like executives or even to those
employed by the company.   Most commentators and authorities seem3
See Henning, Between Chiarella and Congress:  A Guide to4
the Private Cause of Action for Insider Trading Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 39 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1990) ("The term
`inside information' is now common parlance . . . to describe
situations in which previously undisclosed information is used to
gain an unfair transactional or tactical advantage.") (footnote
omitted).  See also Note, Rule 10b-5 and the Evolution of Common
Law Fraud--The Need for an Effective Statutory Proscription of
Insider Trading by Outsiders, 22 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 813, 815 ("In
recent years, insider trading has grown to include conduct by
`outsiders,' or those individuals with no direct ties to the
corporation in question.") (footnote omitted).  
  See Henning, supra note 4, at 1 n.2 ("The term `insider5
trading' is a misnomer because it applies to trading by persons
who are not insiders of the corporate issuer."); Committee on
Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task Force on
Regulation of Insider Trading, Part I:  Regulation Under the
Antifraud Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 41
Bus. Law. 223, 224 (1985) ("`Insider trading' is, of course, a
misnomer.").
  For a brief discussion of how these markets function, see6
2
to use "insider trading" in this broad sense,  although the term4
may seem a misnomer.5
Furthermore, this treatise is concerned with stock market
insider trading, on both stock exchanges and the over-the-counter
market,  and generally not with face-to-face transactions in6
infra §3:3.1.
  Section 15:2 infra, on the state common law of insider7
trading, analyzes close corporation cases because of the paucity
of common law cases involving stock market transactions.
  See infra §6:7 notes 476-86 and accompanying text.8
  See infra §3:3.1.  For discussion of the related9
difficulty of drawing the line between "fortuitous" and "non-
fortuitous" stock transactions, see infra §8.2.2.
3
closely held corporations.   Nevertheless, a stock market insider7
trade is not necessarily anonymous.  First, it may be possible
afterwards to identify the party on the opposite side.   Second,8
much stock market trading is in large blocks between parties who
negotiate with each other.  Block trades blur the line between
face-to-face and so-called "anonymous" stock market
transactions.9
This treatise analyzes the application of various laws to
stock market insider trading and tipping.  Among the federal laws
are Exchange Act section 16, Exchange Act section 10(b), SEC rule
10b-5, mail/wire fraud, SEC rule 14e-3, and Securities Act
section 17(a).  The state laws discussed are the common law, the
Uniform Securities Act, and the California and New York
securities statutes.
Other chapters address government enforcement of the
insider trading/tipping prohibitions and compare the harmful and
allegedly beneficial effects of stock market insider trading.
  See infra §14:1.10
  See id.11
  See id.12
4
Corporate law practitioners and others concerned with
securities law compliance and prevention of illegal insider
trading and tipping will be especially interested in chapter 13
("Compliance Programs") and chapter 14 ("`Insider Trading' Under
Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act").  Chapter 13 suggests
compliance programs for corporations, financial intermediaries,
and professional firms.
Exchange Act section 16(a) requires statutorily defined
"insiders" of certain corporations to report their beneficial
ownership of the corporation's "equity securities" and the 
changes in these holdings.   Section 16(b) allows the10
corporation to recover the profits realized by these same
insiders through a purchase and sale (or sale and purchase) of
any "equity security" (of the corporation) within a period of
less than six months.   Section 16(c) forbids short sales of the11
corporation's "equity securities" by these same statutorily
defined insiders.   Section 16's restricted coverage limits its12
application to insider trading.
The interrelationship of many of the remaining chapters is
best demonstrated with a hypothetical situation.  Assume that the
SEC and the Justice Department accuse an individual of illegally
tipping or trading on material nonpublic information about a
       For discussion of the classical "special relationship"13
theory, see infra §§5:2, 5:3.  United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S.
642, 651-652, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2207 (1997), called this doctrine
the "`traditional' or `classical' theory of insider trading
liability."  For discussion of O'Hagan, see infra §§4:4.5,
4:5.2[B], 5:4 & notes 549-53, 5:4.1[B], 9:3.3.
       See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 649-666, 11714
S. Ct. 2199, 2206-2214 (1997).  For discussion of the
misappropriation theory, see infra §§4:5.2, 5:4.  For discussion
of O'Hagan, see infra §§4:4.5, 4:5.2[B], 5:4 & notes 549-53,
5:4.1[B], 9:3.3.
       For discussion of the federal mail and wire fraud15
statutes, see infra chapter 11.
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publicly traded stock.  The treatise examines the array of laws
that cover the alleged misconduct.
The principal ones are the following "five fingers of
federal fraud":
1.  the section 10(b)/rule 10b-5 classical "special
relationship" theory, endorsed by the Supreme Court.13
2.  the section 10(b)/rule 10b-5 misappropriation doctrine,
endorsed by the Supreme Court.14
3.  federal mail and wire fraud, which the Supreme Court
has unanimously held applies to stock market insider
trading and tipping and which the Congress has since
broadened further.15
       For discussion of SEC rule 14e-3, see infra chapter 9.16
       For discussion of §17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,17
see infra chapter 10.
For another concise description of the federal law
regulating insider trading (including section 16), see Committee
on Corporate Laws, Section of Business Law, American Bar
Association, Corporate Director's Guidebook 79-82 (4th ed. 2004);
Section of Business Law, American Bar Association, Corporate
Director's Guidebook--2002-2003 Edition, 59 Bus. Law. 1057, 1108-
1110 (2004).  For an overview of the federal and state laws
regulating insider trading, see Taylor, Teaching an Old Law New
Tricks:  Rethinking Section 16, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 1315, 1319-1348
(1997).  For a brief description of SEC Rule 10b-5's application
to insider trading, see Haynes, Insider Trading Under Rule 10b-5,
29 ALI-ABA Bus. L. Course Materials J. #5, Oct. 2005, at 5.
       For discussion of some of these requirements, see infra18
§§4:1-4:6.
       For the definition of "material" under §10(b) and rule19
6
4.  SEC rule 14e-3, regulating insider trading and tipping
in the context of tender offers.16
5.  Securities Act section 17(a).17
One of the most important weapons is Exchange Act section
10(b)/SEC rule 10b-5.  Initially, one must determine whether the
accused's conduct met the many requirements of a section
10(b)/rule 10b-5 violation.   For example, was the information18
material  and non-public ?  Did the individual have the19 20
10b-5, see infra §4:2.
       For the definition of "nonpublic" under §10(b) and rule20
10b-5, see infra §4:3.
       For discussion of scienter under §10(b) and rule 10b-5,21
see infra §4:4.
       For discussion of the classical "special relationship22
theory," see infra §§5:2, 5:3.
       For discussion of the misappropriation doctrine, see23
infra §5:4.
       See infra §5:2.1.24
       United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 649-666, 117 S.25
Ct. 2199, 2206-2214 (1997).  See infra §§4:5.2[B], 5:4 & notes
549-53, 5:4.1[B].  For additional discussion of O'Hagan, see
infra §§4:4.5, 9:3.3.
       463 U.S. 646 (1983).26
7
requisite scienter ?  Did the accused breach a duty to disclose21
under the two principal possible bases of section 10(b)/rule 10b-
5 liability:  the classical "special relationship" theory  and22
the misappropriation doctrine?   The Supreme Court has endorsed23
both the first approach  and the second.24 25
The courts use different terms to describe what this book
calls the classical "special relationship" theory, or, more
simply, the "special relationship" theory.  In Dirks v. SEC ,26
the Supreme Court referred to a "special relationship" between
the insider trader and the party on the other side of the
       See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 656 n.15 ("And we do not believe27
that the mere receipt of information from an insider creates such
a special relationship between the tippee and the corporation's
shareholders.").
       445 U.S. 222 (1980).28
       Id. at 246 ("Such confinement in this case is now29
achieved by imposition of a requirement of a `special
relationship' akin to a fiduciary duty before the statute gives
rise to a duty to disclose or to abstain from trading upon
material, nonpublic information.") (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).  See id. at 246 n.1 ("The Court fails to
specify whether the obligations of a special relationship . . .
.") (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
       See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 564-566 (2d30
Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992).
       See, e.g., SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 631 (7th Cir.31
1995); SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 408-409 (7th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439,
443 (9th Cir. 1990).
       521 U.S. 642 (1997).32
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trade.   In his dissent in Chiarella v. United States,  Justice27 28
Blackmun said that the majority required a "special
relationship."   The Second Circuit has employed the term29
"traditional theory" for the same concept.   Other circuit30
courts have used the phrase "classical theory."   In United31
States v. O'Hagan,  the Supreme Court referred to the32
       Id. at 641.  See id. at 652 (employing the term33
"classical theory").
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"`traditional' or `classical theory' of insider trading
liability."   All these terms are synonymous.33
The classical "special relationship" is a triangle:
ISSUER (A) OF THE STOCK TRADED 
EMPLOYEE/INDEPENDENT-CONTRACTOR INNOCENT PARTY ON
TRADER/TIPPER (B-1) OTHER SIDE OF TRADE
[TRADING OUTSIDER/TIPPEE (B-2); (C) (ALREADY A S/H
OUTSIDE TRIANGLE, BUT MAY BE OR BECOMES ONE WITH
PARTICIPANT AFTER THE FACT IN THE TRADE)
B-1'S VIOLATION]
       For discussion of "while in possession of material34
nonpublic information" versus "on the basis of material nonpublic
information," see infra §4:4.5.
       For discussion of why employees (B-1) are in the special35
relationship triangle, see infra §§5:2.1, 5:2.2, 5:2.3[A].  
Independent contractors of the issuer are in the triangle in
the same position as employees (B-1).  See infra §5:2.3[B].  The
issuing corporation itself should also be in the triangle in the
same position as an employee (B-1).  See infra §5.2.3[C].  For
discussion of whether a "temporary insider" may be in the
triangle in the same position as an employee (B-1) even if the
"temporary insider" is neither an employee nor an independent
contractor of the issuer, see infra §5.2.3[D].  For discussion of
whether a controlling or large shareholder may be in the triangle
in the same position as an employee (B-1), see infra §5.2.3[E]. 
For discussion of other possible "special relationships" outside
the classical special relationship triangle, see infra
§§5.2.3.[F], 5.2.3[G], 5.2.3[H].
10
At the apex of the triangle is the issuer (A) of the stock
traded.  At the left base of the triangle is the "corporate
insider" trader/tipper (B-1).  At the right base of the triangle
is the innocent party (C) on the other side of the trade (which
is based on material nonpublic information or while in possession
of such information ).  The "corporate insider" trader/tipper34
(B-1) is in the triangle usually because of his or her direct or
indirect employment by the issuer (A).   The innocent party (C)35
       For discussion of this classical special relationship36
triangle, see infra §5:2.1.
       For discussion of tipper liability under the classical37
special relationship theory, see infra §5:2.8.
       For discussion of tippee liability under the classical38
special relationship theory, see infra §5:3.
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on the other side of the trade is in the triangle because of his
or her ownership of stock of the issuer (A).
Because of their mutual relationship to the issuer (A), the
"corporate insider" trader/tipper (B-1) and the party (C) on the
other side of the trade have a special relationship.  The special
relationship creates a duty to disclose.36
Under the classical special relationship theory, a
"corporate insider"/tipper (B-1) breaches his or her fiduciary
duty by tipping only if he or she receives a personal benefit
from the disclosure.   The outsider/tippee (B-2) enters the37
triangle if the "corporate insider"/tipper (B-1) breaches a duty
by tipping and if the tippee (B-2) knows or should know of that
breach.  In that instance, the tippee (B-2) participates after
the fact in the "corporate insider"/tipper's (B-1) breach of a
duty to disclose to the party (C) on the other side of the
tippee's trade.38
Many stock market insider traders or tippers may escape
liability under the classical special relationship theory.  One
example is someone who is neither an employee of the issuer, the
       For references to discussion of various other possible39
"special relationships" see supra note 35.
       See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 649-666, 11740
S. Ct. 2199, 2206-2214 (1997).  For discussion of O'Hagan, see
infra §§4:4.5, 4:5.2[B], 5:4 & notes 549-53, 5:4.1[B], 9:3.3.
       521 U.S. at 647, 117 S. Ct. at 2205 ("breach of a41
fiduciary duty to the source of the information"); 521 U.S. at
652, 117 S. Ct. at 2207 ("breach of a duty owed to the source of
the information").
     For the full text of rule 10b5-1 and the accompanying42
release, see infra Appendix 5A, reprinting SEC Rel. Nos. 33-7881,
34-43154, IC-24599, File No. S7-31-99, 73 S.E.C. Docket 3 (Aug.
15, 2000).  For discussion of rule 10b5-1, see infra §§4:4.5,
4:5.3, 5:2.3[C][1] & nn.146-49, 5:2.3[G] n.326, 13:2.3 & n.48,
13:2.4, 13:3.3, 13:5.2.[C][3], 13:6.2[B] & nn.401-06.
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equivalent of an employee, nor a direct or indirect tippee of
such an employee or employee-equivalent.39
To fill this gap, the Supreme Court has endorsed the
misappropriation doctrine.   This theory bases section 10(b) and40
rule 10b-5 liability on a breach of duty to the information
source.41
In August 2000, the Commission adopted rule 10b5-1,  which
provides that rule 10b-5 insider trading liability generally
arises when someone trades while "aware" of material nonpublic
information, but also provides certain exceptions from
liability.   Rule 10b5-1(a) states:42
For the text of the rule as originally proposed and its
accompanying release, see SEC Rel. Nos. 33-7787, 34-42259, IC-
24209, File No. S7-31-99, 71 S.E.C. Docket 732 (Dec. 20, 1999),
[1999-2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶86,228, at
82,846 [release hereinafter cited as Proposing Release],
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-42259.htm.
For the SEC staff's answers to some frequently asked
questions about rule 10b5-1, see
www.sec.gov/interps/telephone/phonesupplement4.htm.
     See Proposing Release, supra note 42, Part III.A.2, at43
82,860, text at note 86 (citing United States v. O'Hagan, 521
13
General.  The "manipulative and deceptive devices"
prohibited by Section 10(b) of the Act . . . and [rule] 10b-
5 thereunder include among other things, the purchase or
sale of a security of any issuer, on the basis of material
nonpublic information about that security or issuer, in
breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed
directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that
security or the shareholders of that issuer, or to any other
person who is the source of the material nonpublic
information.
The release accompanying the proposed rule stated: "This
language incorporates all theories of insider trading liability
under the case law--classical insider trading, temporary insider
theory, tippee liability, and trading by someone who
misappropriated the inside information.43
U.S. 642 (1997), Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980)).
       484 U.S. 19, 25-28 (1987).  Carpenter is discussed in44
several sections of chapter 11, including §§11:3.1, 11:3.2[A].
       18 U.S.C. §1346, as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-69045
(1988), provides: "For the purposes of this chapter, the term
`scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to
deprive another of the intangible right of honest services."
       See infra chapter 9.46
14
  In criminal prosecutions of insider trading or tipping, the
federal mail and wire fraud statutes are another major weapon. 
In Carpenter v. United States,  a unanimous Supreme Court held44
that certain insider trading and tipping defendants violated the
federal mail fraud and wire fraud statutes.  After Carpenter,
Congress in 1988 amended the United States Code chapter
containing both the mail and wire fraud statutes to provide that
"schemes to defraud" include schemes "to deprive another of the
intangible right of honest services."   This amendment enlarged45
the already broad sweep of mail/wire fraud and increased further
its importance in criminal prosecution of insider trading and
tipping.
 In addition to section 10(b)/rule 10b-5 and mail/wire fraud,
other federal statutes or SEC rules may apply.  SEC rule 14e-3
covers insider trading and tipping in the tender offer context.  46
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 prohibits fraud in
       See infra §§10:1, 10:3.47
       See infra §§10:1, 10:3, 10:4.  For general discussion of48
§17(a)'s application to stock market insider trading and tipping,
see infra chapter 10.
       See infra chapter 7.49
       See infra §§4:7 - 4:9.50
       For discussion of §20A's limitation to violations of the51
Exchange Act and its rules, see infra §10:7.
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the offer or sale of securities, including negligent conduct.  47
This latter statutory provision is broad enough to cover some
selling on insider information or tipping of bearish nonpublic
news.48
The book also examines the civil and criminal remedies and
penalties the government might seek to impose on the defendant.49
Regardless of Justice Department or SEC action, private
civil plaintiffs may sue an accused insider trader or tipper. 
The treatise describes some elements of private civil liability,
including the remedies obtainable.50
Plaintiffs may have either an express or an implied private
action under various federal statutes and rules.  Securities
Exchange Act section 20A creates an express private action for
contemporaneous traders suing someone whose insider trade or tip
violates the Exchange Act or its rules,  including section51
10(b)/rule 10b-5 and rule 14e-3.
       See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v.52
Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 358 (1991) ("this Court repeatedly has
recognized the validity of such claims") (citations omitted);
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) ("The
existence of this implied remedy is simply beyond
peradventure."); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196
(1976) ("the existence of a private cause of action . . . is now
well established") (citations omitted).
       See infra §11:1 note 17 and accompanying text.53
       See infra §10:5.54
       See infra §9:4.2.55
       See infra §§6:2, 9:4.2.56
       See supra text accompanying note 11.57
16
  The Supreme Court has recognized an implied private cause of
action under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5,  but has not ruled52
whether such causes of action exist under mail/wire fraud,
Securities Act section 17(a), or SEC rule 14e-3.  The lower
courts, however, have uniformly held that a private right of
action does not exist under the mail fraud or wire fraud
statutes.   The clear trend in recent circuit court opinions is53
to refuse to imply such a suit under Securities Act section
17(a).   Whether an implied private action exists under SEC rule54
14e-3 is unclear ; nevertheless, Exchange Act section 20A55
creates an express private action against rule 14e-3 violators.56
As mentioned earlier,  section 16(b) expressly allows57
certain corporations to recover the "short-swing" profits of
       For discussion of §16(b), see infra chapter 14.58
       See infra chapter 8.59
       See infra chapter 15.60
       See infra chapter 2.61
       See infra chapter 3.62
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statutorily defined insiders who trade the company's "equity
securities."  Section 16(b)'s cause of action is available only
in extremely limited circumstances.58
One chapter describes the approach to insider trading and
tipping of the American Law Institute's Federal Securities
Code.   Congress has not adopted this Code.59
In addition to federal law, state law may apply.  This
treatise discusses whether an alleged insider trader violates
state common law, the Uniform Securities Act, the New York
securities statute, or the California securities statute.60
  Two chapters examine the justification for the regulation of
stock market insider trading.  These chapters may be of special
interest to academics in law and other disciplines.  One chapter
analyzes the alleged benefits and detriments to society of stock
market insider trading.61
Another chapter discusses the harm to individual investors
from insider trading in an impersonal stock market.   Each stock62
market insider trade has specific victims, although they are
unidentifiable in practice.  The outstanding number of shares of
a company generally remains constant between the insider trade
and public dissemination of the information on which the insider
       See infra §3:3.5.63
       See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.64
18
acted.  With an insider purchase of an existing issue of
securities, the insider has more of that issue at dissemination;
someone else must have less.  That someone is worse off because
of the insider trade.  With an insider sale of an existing issue
of securities, the insider has less of that issue at
dissemination; someone else must have more.  That someone is
worse off because of the insider trade.  This book calls this
phenomenon "the law of conservation of securities."63
In summary, as a supplement to both state law and Exchange
Act section 16, the principal weapons against stock market
insider trading and tipping consist of "five fingers of federal
fraud" :  the section 10(b)/rule 10b-5 classical special64
relationship theory, the section 10(b)/rule 10b-5
misappropriation theory, federal mail and wire fraud, SEC rule
14e-3, and Securities Act section 17(a).
